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Before Vietnam: Understanding the 
Initial Stages of U.S. Involvement in 
Southeast Asia, 1945-1949 
Jacob Mach 
History and Government 
Introduction  
he Vietnam War, widely considered the worst foreign policy debacle in American 
history, remains the most controversial event of the twentieth century. Much 
criticism for Vietnam involvement stems from two sources: 1) disapproval with 
how American leadership conducted the war, and 2) disagreement over the reason for the 
conflict in the first place. Few historians, if any, dispute the first criticism. The historical 
community remains divided, however, in terms of a definitive position on the basis or 
origin for the conflict. For a holistic approach to the origin of the Vietnam War, one must 
first elucidate the conception of American intervention in the region, including “why” and 
“how” it arose. Any analysis of American involvement in Vietnam must begin with 
President Truman and his administration following the conclusion of the Second World 
War. Only when viewed in the context of US foreign policy during the Cold War can this be 
accomplished. America’s initial involvement in Southeast Asia in the context of the 
developing Cold War must be thoroughly examined to more fully understand the origins of 
the Vietnam War.  
The traditional view posited by historians such as Alonzo Hamby and David McCullough 
praises Truman for his character and resilience in facing an extraordinary foreign policy 
landscape.  Truman met the unprecedented challenges brought on by the rise of the Soviet 
Union and communism head on and without compromise. Although Hamby criticizes some 
of Truman’s decision making (notably his decision to drop the atomic bomb), he ultimately 
concludes that such decisions were justifiable given the extreme circumstances.  
Revisionist historians of the Truman Presidency, including Arnold Offner, criticize 
Truman’s underlying assumptions of the superiority of democracy and of the United States.  
Additionally, Offner criticizes the confrontational style of Truman, arguing that had he 
remained open to working with the USSR and China, tensions could have been severely 
decreased.  Because of these assumptions, the US’s foreign policy toward  Vietnam was 
doomed for failure, resulting in an unwinnable war. These historians simply believe that 
the US should never have been involved in the first place. While there are various 
interpretations of the foreign policy decisions of the Truman administration, these two 
interpretations contrast sharply. Truman either made consistent and reasonable foreign 
policy decisions or he made foolish and unfounded decisions.  
T 
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To understand the circumstances surrounding the initial stages of American involvement 
in Southeast Asia and Vietnam, it is necessary to consider the developing world events 
following the conclusion of the Second World War. The rehabilitation of Europe, the 
rebuilding of Japan, the rise of the Soviet Union, and an emerging Southeast Asia all 
demanded the attention of Truman and his administration. The situation facing Truman 
was considerably more intricate than many historians acknowledge, which made decision-
making more delicate. While there are plenty of legitimate critiques, in view of the world 
situation and the information available at that time, the Truman Administration truly acted 
in a reasonable fashion amid great uncertainty. Considering the increasingly complex 
situation in Southeast Asia following the Second World War, Truman and his 
administration acted consistently. In light of the threat of Communist expansion, the 
administration was bearing in mind the vested interests of the United States, their Allies, 
and the people of Southeast Asia.  
After a decade of conflict engulfing nearly the entire world, the Second World War finally 
concluded in August 1945. Belligerent nations suffered nearly 100 million casualties, 
civilian and military combined. The United States suffered the death of their President only 
months before the war ended. Franklin Delano Roosevelt steered the United States 
valiantly through four years of warfare. The entirety of the US, and much of the whole free 
world, mourned the loss of FDR. Harry S. Truman, thrust into the Presidency of the most 
powerful nation in the world, ultimately consented to the use of atomic weaponry to end 
the war against Japan. With this pronouncement, Truman made his first of many landmark 
decisions that would define his Presidency. FDR’s legacy, however, continued to have an 
acute impact on the Truman Presidency for years to come, specifically in Southeast Asia.  
Roosevelt held intense anti-colonialist sentiments during his years as President. American 
policy, specifically in the 19th century, tended to be more sympathetic to independence 
movements than many of its European counterparts. While the US did acquire land from 
both Mexico and Spain, its imperialistic gains paled in comparison to the British and French 
empires. This sympathy, coupled with a moralism that included an emphasis on missionary 
work, was the extent of American concern for Southeast Asia until the Second World War.  
Roosevelt, however, differed from his predecessors quite significantly. His anti-colonialism, 
fueled largely by hatred of colonial rule, its lack of democratic tendencies, and his own 
sensitivity to nationalism, recognized that less colonialism meant greater trade 
opportunities for the United States.  Altruism played only a part in Roosevelt’s anti-
colonialist ideas. His administration believed colonialism left room for “‘secret diplomacy’ 
and war,” which Roosevelt endeavored to avoid at all costs.  His allies, however, did not 
hold the same beliefs about colonialism, resulting in friction between the US, Great Britain, 
and France. Both Britain and France maintained colonial holdings throughout the world, 
including Southeast Asia. Despite the entanglements of his allies, Roosevelt remained 
privately anti-colonialist throughout most of the war, which caused concern for Churchill 
and other British officials. The fate of post-war colonial holdings of the Western Allies was 
uncertain.   
Roosevelt focused his attention on French Indochina and argued that the people of 
Indochina were infinitely better off before French interference.  While Roosevelt 
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entertained the idea of pushing the French to place the colony into an international 
trusteeship after the war, he decided to curb his criticism of colonialism for the sake of the 
Allied war effort. In January 1945, Roosevelt declared a prohibition on US involvement in 
French Indochina until the end of the war (this included helping the French rid the country 
of the Japanese).  Roosevelt would not live to see the end of the war, but his hardline 
personal views on colonialism created a lasting tension between the Allies. Both Britain 
and France were irritated by FDR’s stance, and Truman needed to restore the relationship 
with his closest, most important allies.  This was the atmosphere with the death of 
Roosevelt. Thankfully for the Allied leaders, Truman did not maintain the harsh stance of 
his predecessor. The Western Allied countries received their colonial holdings after the war 
with little trouble, but the uneasy situation in Southeast Asia would only grow in the 
coming decade.  
As a result of the tenuous relationship with his closest allies, Truman took a step back from 
the hardline rhetoric of his predecessor to assure the Allies of their continued control in 
Southeast Asia.  In fact, American policy toward both Indochina and Southeast Asia was 
marked by a certain “ambivalence.”  No distinct policy directed what transpired in the 
region. Instead, Truman opted for a “hands off” approach. He and his administration 
desired to stay “neutral” in Southeast Asia, not fully supporting the independence 
movements in the region or their Western Allies. That is, until an official policy toward 
Indochina surfaced in 1947.  Their neutrality, however, generally favored their European 
allies and help to restore the relationships damaged by the Roosevelt Administration.  The 
ultimate cause for such ambivalence in Southeast Asia stemmed from the emergence of the 
Soviet Union. Although Joseph Stalin, leader of the USSR, promised free and open elections 
throughout Eastern Europe, he immediately used his power to support, or in some cases, 
place Communist-leaning leaders such as Bulgaria and Romania in control of governments 
in Eastern European nations. Churchill foresaw the impending clash between the two 
political systems as early as March 1946 when he gave his famous “Iron Curtain” Speech.  
Truman slowly realized that Europe needed his full attention, and Southeast Asia soon 
faded as the Soviet Union rose to the forefront of US foreign policy concerns.  
The single most important document in the evolving situation between the US and the 
Soviet Union was George Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” sent to Secretary of State James 
Byrnes in February 1946. George Kennan proved influential in many foreign policy 
decisions of the early post-war years, and his “Long Telegram” was no exception. Kennan 
believed the USSR existed in a state of antagonism toward Western capitalist nations, 
referencing a statement made by Stalin the First American Trade Union Delegation in 1927. 
It argued that a battle between the socialist center (Moscow) and the capitalist center of 
the world (United States) would “decide the fate of capitalism and of communism in the 
entire world."  Thus, Kennan deduced Soviet policy toward the West, and the United States 
would serve to ensure the success of the socialist center and debilitate the capitalist center. 
Not only would it seek to weaken the West as a whole, but they would also, Kennan 
warned, seek to increase divisions between capitalist Allies. This included leveraging non-
communist political leaders against capitalist nations.  In light of those goals, he warned 
that the USSR and US would not coexist peacefully, nor did he think Soviet officials believed 
such potential existed.  He cautioned the US government not to take the circumstances 
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lightly. Although he hoped the situation would not devolve into wholesale war, he advised 
officials to take thoughtful precautions as if they were fighting a war.  Such was the gravity 
of the situation Kennan described to US officials, and the US did not need to wait long to see 
Kennan’s warnings come to fruition.  
In March 1946, only a month after Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” civil war broke out in Greece. 
Greek Communist forces backed by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Albania, fought with 
government forces backed by the British and the United States (although true American 
assistance did not arrive until 1947). The Soviet support of this attempted communist 
takeover displayed what Kennan predicted in his “Long Telegram.”  A separate government 
report, the Clifford-Elsey Report, written in September 1946, supported Kennan by arguing 
the USSR had and would continue to provoke animosity between the East and West 
through any and all methods available.  The Soviet support of the Greek communist force, 
the report argued, was a clear example of a Soviet attempt to gain entrance into a 
previously non-communist state. George Marshall commented, “we are faced with the first 
crisis of a series which might extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle East, and 
Asia,” a statement with which Kennan and others readily agreed.  Both Kennan’s “Long 
Telegram” and the Clifford-Elsey Report directly contributed to the Domino Theory, which 
is the idea that the fall of one country to Communism would result in Communist 
insurgencies in the surrounding countries. This theory influenced the development of the 
most significant foreign policy decision of the 20th century: the Truman Doctrine.   
The Truman Doctrine, working in conjunction with the Marshall Plan, radically reoriented 
American foreign policy toward two interrelated goals: 1) rebuilding a democratic, 
capitalist dominated Europe, and 2) defending against an ever expanding, ever aggressive 
Soviet-style Communism. Truman believed there was no other option; the information he 
received reinforced containing communism. His political advisors cautioned that a failure 
to check Soviet expansion would result in Soviet domination of Europe. In response to the 
aggressive actions of the Soviet Union and the information received from political advisors 
like Kennan, Truman called for Congress to allocate $400 million in assistance to Greece, 
and later Turkey, in their fight against Communist insurgencies supported by the Soviet 
Union.  These Communist insurgencies could result in far-reaching effects felt by the entire 
world. The concern was that if Greece or Turkey fell to Communism, other rebuilding 
European nations would also be in danger of falling to Communism.  Although Kennan 
cautioned the President not to promise support to all the world in fighting against 
Communism, Truman declared that it “must be the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside 
pressures.”   
The line in the sand was drawn. The Truman Doctrine cemented the approach of the 
Truman administration in Europe and eventually in Southeast Asia; it would be hardline, 
fixed, and immovable against the expansionistic plans of the USSR.  Dean Acheson, who 
served as Truman’s Secretary of State, would play an ongoing role in the development of 
foreign policy. Truman trusted him implicitly and lauded his instrumental part in crafting 
the Doctrine.  The Truman Doctrine, however, was only part of the two-pronged attack on 
Soviet expansion. The Marshall Plan played an equally essential role in checking the 
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expansion of the Soviet Union and in creating a strong, democratic Europe not disposed to 
Communism.  
The Marshall Plan, named for its chief originator, George Marshall, called for nearly $17 
billion in American funds to assist in the rebuilding of Europe.  The majority of funds went 
to Great Britain and France, the two nations who expended the most resources during the 
war. Britain and France also represented the two largest economies in Europe and their 
economic rehabilitation was imperative to the success of the Marshall Plan throughout the 
continent. The war devastated the industrial capabilities of Western Europe, weakening 
their economic capabilities severely. The Marshall plan operated under the belief that 
economic instability leads to political instability, leaving countries open to communist 
revolutions. If they did not fall to Communism, the resulting weak economic output would 
cause a dip in production, which would plunge the continent into a depression it could not 
handle. American policy operated under a combination of altruism and self-interest; a 
sincere desire to help their Allies rebuild coupled with a desire to prevent a worldwide 
depression that the United States would inevitably experience as well.  The Marshall Plan 
called for an astronomical amount of funds, a call that Congress heavily debated. Truman 
and his advisors ultimately swayed Congress, however, arguing that the funds were 
necessary to check Soviet expansion.  Ironically, Marshall Plan dollars were offered to the 
Soviet Union and the states under their sphere of influence. Consistent with the 
information presented by Kennan in 1946, however, the USSR turned down the offer and 
refused to allow any of the Eastern European countries to accept any money from the 
Western nations.  Stalin refused to allow any “capitalist” influence in regions under his 
control. The West vs. East schism continued, affirming the predictions of Truman’s political 
advisors. How did these developments in Europe, however, effect the landscape in 
Southeast Asia? While Europe took precedence both economically and politically, Southeast 
Asia remained intimately connected with the evolving situation in Europe. The colonial 
holdings of Great Britain and France would play a substantial role in rebuilding after the 
war.   
French influence first arrived in Indochina through a Jesuit preacher named Father 
Alexander de Rhodes.  The Jesuits, characterized by a sincere desire to spread the Catholic 
message, sent missionaries around the world, including Asia and South America. French 
colonization of Indochina, however, began in the 1870’s following the creation of the Third 
French Republic. Their intent, however, was to acquire resources, not to spread the 
Catholic message.  Decades passed before Indochina became a valuable portion of the 
French Empire. The French developed rubber colonies in Indochina which proved to be 
extremely valuable (rubber was a precious commodity of the time). By the 1920’s, French 
Indochina became the largest rubber producer in the world, creating a valuable industry 
for the French that hired 80,000 Indochinese.  Unrest grew in Indochina, however, as many 
inhabitants decried poor working conditions and their inferior status compared to the 
French living in the region. In response, the French significantly improved the plantations, 
making working conditions more tolerable. In addition, the French created opportunities 
for the Indochinese to receive a French education.  These advances placated the unrest of 
the Indochinese for a time, but desires for independence soon enveloped the country, 
creating a turbulent situation for the French. Meanwhile, a Vietnamese nationalist named 
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Ho Chi Minh catapulted himself onto the world stage in the name of Vietnamese 
independence.  
Born in 1890, Ho Chi Minh traveled to France where he received a Western education and 
involved himself with the French Socialist Party. In the 1920’s he ventured to Russia where 
his communist/socialist ideology continued to develop. He even served as a Comintern 
agent (International Communist Advocate) during his time in Russia.  These sojourns 
helped cement his growing nationalist ideas as well as his communist leanings. In 1941 he 
returned to French Indochina to lead a Vietnamese independence movement known as the 
Vietminh. While the organization was not technically a Communist entity (progressive 
nationalist), the leadership of the Vietminh contained embers of the Indochinese 
Communist Party.  The French, aware of Minh’s affiliation with Communism, grew 
concerned with a possible communist revolution in the region. The Second World War 
prohibited any decreased tension between the French and the Vietminh; the Japanese 
wrested control from the French Vichy government in early 1945, asserting Bao Dai as 
emperor of the region, an act that would last only until the end of the war in August.  The 
Vietminh, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, continued to grow in number during the 
war. After the war, the Japanese surrender created significant issues for the Allies, though it 
did eliminate Japanese from the region, which greatly relieved the Indochinese. British 
troops entered Indochina to organize the surrender of the Japanese, while the Free French 
tried to bring control back to the region. As tens of thousands of British troops entered 
Indochina, Ho Chi Minh declared independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV). The British did not want to entangle themselves in a French conflict and quickly left 
the region.  The French responded to the Vietminh with violence, and the country plunged 
into war. The year 1946 marked a turning point for French activity in Indochina, a subject 
which will be addressed later. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Great Britain and the United 
States drastically increased their involvement.  
Great Britain maintained a vast but shrinking colonial empire well into the twentieth 
century with Malaya and Burma serving as the most profitable colonies for the British in 
Southeast Asia. Independence movements like those in Vietnam quickly spread to the 
British colonies, creating a tenuous situation for British leadership. On the one hand, 
British officials constantly encouraged the French to give concessions to Minh in Vietnam.  
The post-war world brought new opportunities for previously colonized countries to create 
their own governments, and the British understood this desire for self-government. 
Democracy needed to be the hallmark of the post-war world. The problem for British 
officials, however, was the post-war conditions in both Malaya and Burma. Glenn Abbey, an 
American diplomat in Burma, wrote to Secretary of State James Byrnes in 1946 about the 
situation the British faced. Though British and American leaders desired independence for 
Burma, the country, decimated by the war, was simply not ready for such responsibility.  
The economic situation simply had too much to balance. If Burma failed, the whole Asiatic 
region stood at risk for destabilization.  In addition, Abbey showed concern for possible 
Communist intervention, “Unless the new Government can get off to a good start 
economically… [it] will be subjected to infiltrations of totalitarian methods.”  The same 
fears dictated the Western approach to Malaya, where the Communist threat was more 
prominent.  
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In Malaya, British officials continued to monitor both the Soviet Union and Communist 
elements of China for any possible influence there.  The situation in Indochina/Vietnam 
worried the British. While they knew independence would inevitably come for Malaya, 
officials were concerned about the potential Communist influence. In turn, the British 
slowed their approach to independence due to the economic importance of the colony and 
the Communist threat to the region.  Britain desperately needed the production power of 
Malaya to emerge from its dilapidated economic state, but a prolonged colonialism could 
create more unrest. Malaya provided the British with precious quantities of rubber and tin, 
creating industries that the British could not afford to lose.  Officials understood the 
Malayan people wanted more independence, and like what was occurring in French 
Indochina, a refusal could drive nationalist groups to Communism. In response, Britain 
relinquished power to the Malayans. They gave them a new constitution in 1948 while 
reiterating that full independence would not come “until the communist insurrection had 
been liquidated.”  Malaya continued to play an important part in post-war Britain for the 
next decade.  
The United States held no colonies in Southeast Asia but, after defeating Japan, they 
inherited an equally demanding and delicate process: the rehabilitation of Japan. In many 
ways, Japan would determine the success or failure of the Allies in Southeast Asia. The 
United States fought the Japanese with little assistance from her other Allies, giving US 
officials the directive in the post-war policy toward Japan.  Almost immediately, US officials 
developed a plan for its post-war activities in Japan. Two significant objectives defined 
their efforts in Japan: 1) purging Japanese nationalists who led the country into war, and 2) 
creating an anti-communist state driven by capitalism.  The United States faced 
demilitarization as its first obstacle in Japan. After the purging of nearly 200,000 
ultranationalists from public service, the US focused on bringing democracy to Japan, the 
only true method of demilitarization in the minds of many US officials.  Such extreme 
purges, however, created an unstable political landscape in Japan, leaving the nation with 
few experienced politicians.   
George Atcheson served as the political advisor to Japan in 1946 and wrote a confidential 
report to President Truman about the developing political situation in Japan. Four main 
political parties arose during the “democratization phase” following the major purges. The 
Japanese quickly developed Progressive, Liberal, Social Democrat, and Communist Parties.  
Although the presence of a Communist party worried Atcheson to some degree, he worried 
more about the development of democracy in Japan. Democracy remained a young political 
theory in Japan, and he recognized the inseparable relationship between economics and 
politics at this time in Japanese history.  Japan suffered greatly during the war, enduring 
bombings that decimated their industrial capabilities. If democracy, as introduced by the 
Americans, failed to quickly produce significant economic output, the Japanese may turn to 
other avenues for provision. Atcheson referred to those other avenues as “extremism of 
types we do not desire,” meaning Soviet Communism.  Two other American diplomats 
bitterly disagreed over the Communist threat to post-war Japan. John Davies, First 
Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, wrote in a 1946 memorandum that the Soviet 
Union disapproved of American policy directives in Japan, and Soviet policy toward Japan 
was specifically designed to prevent the development of friendly relations between the 
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United States and Japan.  This information seemed consistent with the advice given by 
George Kennan concerning Soviet policy toward the US. Davies further warned, “If we 
(United States) withdraw from Japan without having assured ourselves of a favored 
position there, Japan may in all probability sooner or later be captured by the Soviet 
Union.”   
Such a statement evoked a spirited reaction from fellow diplomat John K. Emmerson, 
Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs. He disagreed with the assertions of 
Davies, arguing that the Soviet Union posed an insignificant threat to Japan.  Emmerson 
feared an ideological battle would doom Japan. He wanted to create a Japan dominated by 
neither the US nor the Soviet Union. A policy based upon a non-existent Communist threat 
might damage that possibility.  Robert Fearey of the Office of the Political Advisor in Japan 
held a similar belief to that of Emmerson, but still acknowledged the Communist threat. As 
of April 1946, the Japanese were overwhelmingly pro-American and anti-communist, 
Fearey stated. Such an atmosphere could change, however, if the economic situation did 
not soon improve in Japan.  American officials realized that economic development 
remained crucial to the ultimate success of the rehabilitation of Japan. By 1948, Congress 
appropriated over $100 million for economic development in Japan.  The decision was 
further influenced by the increasingly bleak situation in China.   
The Chinese Civil War officially commenced in 1927, but hostilities remained checked 
throughout the Second World War because of the Japanese occupation of China. The civil 
war pitted government forces under the control of Chang Kai-Shek (Kuomintang) against 
the Communist forces of Mao Zedong (Communist Party of China) for control of the Chinese 
government. The Japanese invasion of China temporarily halted hostilities between the 
KMT and the CPC, focusing their attention on combatting the Japanese invaders. As soon as 
the war ended, however, hostilities again commenced between the two Chinese forces and 
continued until 1950. Stalin and Truman closely monitored the situation in China, knowing 
the result of the war could change the balance of power in Asia. Both leaders wanted to 
ensure victory for their respective allies while avoiding actual war between the two 
superpowers.  Truman immediately faced a major issue; over 60,000 US troops remained 
in China to oversee the surrender of Japanese troops. Stalin did not like the idea of US 
troops stationed in China while the two Chinese factions engaged in active warfare.  The 
situation left the US troops stuck in the middle, worsening the tension between the USSR 
and the US. Both Truman and Stalin wanted to avoid a long-term conflict in China and 
pressured the two sides to come to an armistice. In January 1946, the KMT and CPC agreed 
to allow the Communist party more power within the government, while keeping the KMT 
in charge for the time being.  This compromise merely halted hostilities for a time and 
fighting soon resumed.  
The US monitored the evolving situation closely, concerned about the danger a Communist 
China presented for the region. While the Communist leader, Mao Zedong, publicly stated 
that his party was “independent of Moscow,” the Truman administration viewed these 
assertions with intense skepticism due to his well-documented adherence to Marxist-
Leninism.  The US had little reason to believe Zedong, but it also had little evidence that he 
was lying. In 1945, George Kennan communicated that the Soviets were extremely 
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interested in the possibility of a Communist government in China and would do what it 
could to ensure its success.  A Communist China would drastically change the balance of 
power in Asia, including Southeast Asia. The US confronted a progressively desperate 
situation. As the war in China swung in favor of the Communist forces in 1948-49, US 
leaders grew increasingly concerned. The US assumed a Communist China would operate 
in the same way the Soviet Union did, concentrating their power to expand Communism in 
their immediate vicinity.  Soviet support for Communist China remained strong, leaving US 
officials no choice but to connect the USSR and the CPC. In addition, the Plans and 
Operations division notified Truman that a communist China would result in Communist 
influence in Indochina.  As 1949 wore on, the CPC gained firm control of China. Truman 
faced a monumental decision, one that would impact US-Chinese relations for decades.  
The US was in a quandary. It could recognize the Communist government and seek to 
somehow build a relationship with a potentially antagonistic nation or refuse to legitimize 
the CPC and treat it as an outgrowth of the Soviet Union. The US government was divided 
about China, unlike the application of the Truman Doctrine in Europe which garnered 
significant support from all sides.  The context of the decision on Communist China, 
however, was very different. Dean Acheson and other officials stood in favor of recognizing 
the Communist government in China, hoping such a recognition would encourage a split 
between the Soviets and China, or at the very least form a rift.  The United States was at a 
point of heightened concern about communism, due in large part to the efforts of Joseph 
McCarthy. Truman did not want to go against popular opinion or appear weak against a 
legitimate communist threat to the security of the US and its Allies.  He believed there was 
too much at stake both domestically and internationally to acknowledge the CPC. Even 
while the British recognized the CPC and pushed the Americans to do the same, they 
tempered their rebuke, knowing the necessity of American support moving forward.  
Truman and his administration focused on reorienting their foreign policy approach in 
light of the Communist takeover of China. The Chinese had long been a “benign” friend to 
the US. After its fall to Communism, the US no longer had any relationship with China. The 
US desperately needed a friendly nation in Southeast Asia to supplement the loss suffered 
in China. The Truman administration wanted to create a “collective security” in the region, 
combining economic and military assistance, in essence, to apply the Truman Doctrine in 
Southeast Asia.  Japan stood as the only hope for the US in Asia.  Japan remained the only 
nation who could become a democratic stronghold that the rest of Southeast Asia could 
look to for support. Truman and his officials began to realize the important role Japan 
would play in terms containment in the region. This “collective security” would need a 
stable nation with a successful economy that maintained Western connections, and Japan 
was the only possible location. The hope was to build up Japan to be able to assist other 
nations in Southeast Asia economically, together warding off Communist influence.  US 
foreign policy was firmly entrenched in preventing the spread of Communism both in 
Europe and Southeast Asia. Its goal was to create a Southeast Asia united against 
communism on its own, only utilizing Western assistance when necessary.  This further 
development of containment-based foreign policy came in the midst of a second flourishing 
Communist revolution, this time in Vietnam.  
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While the US was firmly committed in Japan by 1948-49, the same could not be said for the 
US in Vietnam. The French, still engaged in war against Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh, 
continually appealed for US support in Vietnam. Minh claimed his government to be “the 
only legitimate government throughout Indochina,” which made the French appear as evil 
imperialists.  Non-communist national groups failed to unite the Vietnamese as effectively 
as Minh, resulting in the massive support for the Vietminh. Where non-communist groups 
failed, Minh succeeded, broadening his message to include those who wanted to be free 
from French influence and not just communist sympathizers.  Moreover, the French 
treatment of the Indochinese in the immediate post-war period pushed many inhabitants 
from “nonviolent reformism to advocacy of radical revolution.”  Although Ho painted the 
French as imperialists, French leaders saw Minh and his Vietminh as a roadblock to their 
goals for the region, not a legitimate threat to French sovereignty. The potential connection 
to Communism, however, did concern many. French officials remained convinced that the 
Vietnamese nationalists under Minh were using nationalism as a guise for Soviet-inspired 
Communism in Indochina, although corroborating evidence for such claims was lacking at 
the time.  Such a claim, no doubt, weighed on the mind of Truman and his advisors. Could 
they allow a genuine Communist threat, even a non-Soviet Communist threat, to grow in an 
Allied controlled colony?  
With the French requesting for assistance notwithstanding, the US continued to be hesitant 
and nonreactive. It was clear that Truman wanted the Vietnam problem to remain a French 
issue, though the potential communist threat made complete non-involvement nearly 
impossible.  Further muddling the situation, the American Ambassador in France, Jefferson 
Caffrey, wrote to the Secretary of State in 1947. Caffrey, a highly respected diplomat, 
reminded the Secretary of “Ho’s long and prominent connection with world Communism,” 
which slowly came to the attention of the French.  If Minh did succeed, which Caffrey 
considered a high possibility, Vietnam would certainly become Communist. The French 
were fighting a battle destined for failure. History showed, he explained, “how [a] relatively 
small, but well-trained and determined, minority can take over power in an area where 
democratic traditions are weak.”  Caffrey, along with persistent requests from the French 
government, presented Truman with an ultimatum: either assist the French and preserve 
the status quo, or see Vietnam fall to Communism while the French lose a valuable colony, 
severely damage US-French relations, and potentially threaten European recovery and 
security in Southeast Asia.  
As the 1940’s ended, the Truman administration faced a crisis in Southeast Asia, 
specifically in Vietnam. The US government needed to take a definitive position on the 
French efforts in Vietnam; it could no longer remain “neutral.” Whatever the US decided to 
do, it would differ greatly from the approach it took with the Dutch in Indonesia. From 
1945-1949, US policy used a hardline approach toward Dutch Indonesia by attempting to 
force the Dutch out of their colonial holding. The US government pressed the Dutch on 
multiple occasions, even threatening to pull financial aid for the Netherlands if they refused 
to work toward independence in Indonesia.  Communism did not threaten Indonesia as it 
did Vietnam, which allowed the US to push the Dutch harder toward independence. Allied 
officials did not need to worry about a free Indonesia becoming Communist because 
Communism did not have a foothold in the country. Most importantly, the Netherlands 
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contributed less to European recovery than did the French; the US could not afford to lose 
valuable and essential French assistance for the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 
Europe.  The US approach to Vietnam was delicate given the relationship between the US, 
France, and European economic recovery/communist containment.  
As the French worked to establish Bao Dai (former emperor under the Japanese occupation 
of Indochina) as the leader of the independent State of Vietnam, the US position began to 
take shape.  Vietnam, in contrast to Indonesia, was key to stability in Southeast Asia, as well 
as for economic stability for France.  Economically, Vietnam remained extremely valuable 
for a still recovering France. The colony still held $2 billion in French investments, mainly 
in rice and rubber, commodities it could scarcely afford to give up given its importance to 
the recovery of Western Europe.  Politically, Vietnam became an “important link in the US 
defensive perimeter” against communism in Southeast Asia.  This was due in large part to 
two assumptions made by US officials: 1) China was looking to expand its Communist 
influence either through arms/aid to groups like the Vietminh, or directly to Minh, and 2) 
the rest of Southeast Asia would be directly threatened if Vietnam fell to Communism.  
While theoretically the US could allow France to handle the situation on its own, potential 
Communist containment took precedence.  Historical American disapproval for colonialism 
was pitted against communist containment and friendship with the most important US ally 
in continental Europe.   
In 1948, the US made its first move toward intervention in Vietnam. In August, the 
government assisted the French in Vietnam under the pretext of “anti-communism.”  
Though, some US officials balked at such an offer, given the indiscernible link between 
Minh and Moscow. No thoughtful official doubted Minh’s communism, however, in light of 
his professed Communist views and connections with the French Communist Party, the 
Indochinese Communist Party, the USSR, and Communist China.  Some officials pleaded 
with Truman to listen to Minh and seek some kind of compromise between the French and 
the Vietminh. This was never seriously considered, however, due to Truman’s policy to not 
acknowledge Communist governments or work with them.  Archimedes Patti, an Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) agent in Vietnam, argued that had the Truman administration 
treated Ho better and treated him more like a nationalist and less like a communist, conflict 
could have been avoided. The suggestion, however, ignores the volatile nature of Southeast 
Asia and the risk associated with such an assumption.  Also, the decision would have 
alienated and angered the French, hindering European recovery, which was the US 
government’s primary foreign policy concern in the immediate post-war years.  
Conclusion 
Eventually, the National Security Council (NSC) prompted Truman to finalize American 
intervention in Vietnam. The Council, created by Truman in 1947, served as the principle 
avenue used by the President to make foreign policy decisions. The goal of the Council was 
to help organize and synthesize data to present the President with all relevant information 
about foreign policy matters.  Its goal was not to be a powerful, all-encompassing 
organization acting on its own prerogative. Rather, it allowed Truman (and future 
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Presidents) to utilize all the agencies at his disposal to come to the best possible 
conclusions.  An NSC report written in December 1949 about the situation in Southeast 
Asia cemented Truman’s decision for American involvement in Vietnam. The report 
suggested three basic objectives the US must meet in Southeast Asia: 1) develop military 
power in non-Communist states in Southeast Asia for security, 2) work for the gradual 
reduction of Soviet influence in the region, and 3) prevent “power relationships” that 
would challenge the security of the US (or its Allies).  The first point carried the most 
weight in the context of Vietnam. The French offered an alternative to Ho and his 
communist/nationalist Vietminh in Bao Dai. Dai was the “non-Communist force” available 
in Vietnam. This approach allowed the US to support an alternative to a Communist 
organization, while supporting French wishes in the region. Additionally, the NSC 
suggested that the US work toward “resolving the colonial-nationalist conflict in such a way 
as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist movement while at the same time 
minimizing the strain on colonial powers who are our Western allies.”  Such a plan would 
support both the nationalist, non-communist movement in Vietnam, and the French who 
were desperate to find an alternative to Ho Chi Minh.   
Ambassador Caffrey indicated that expressed support for the proposed Bao Dai 
government, though risky, would increase the likelihood of success in the long term.  
Failure of the government would inevitably hurt the world perception of US power, but no 
alternative solution existed that satisfied all foreign policy objectives stated by Truman and 
his advisors. Some officials, like Charles Reed, Consul to Saigon, disagreed with the 
potential backing of the French because he was not confident the French would maintain 
their commitments to the extent they claimed. Dean Acheson favored the perspective of 
Reed, stating that no amount of American support could amount to any success “unless it 
can rally the support of the people.”  The world situation, however, prompted the final 
decision. Communist movements posed a significant threat in Czechoslovakia, and China 
was firmly entrenched in Communism.  The US could not bear the loss of the Southeast Asia 
to Communism neither the loss of an essential ally in France. In February 1950, the US 
finally declared recognition of the Bao Dai government in Vietnam and committed to the 
military and economic assistance of Southeast Asia by March of that year, totaling $15 
million.  Acheson, not completely in favor, reasoned such a declaration would communicate 
“displeasure with Communist tactics” and hopefully embolden other nationalist, non-
communist groups in the region.  In less than five years, the US radically altered their 
approach to Southeast Asia. The Truman administration moved from “strict 
noninvolvement to unconditional support of the French” in an effort to accomplish the 
many foreign policy objectives set throughout Europe, Asia, and domestically.  The US 
remained entrenched in Vietnam for the next two decades.  
The Truman administration came to power in a volatile time and faced an increasingly 
complex, multifaceted foreign policy landscape. Historians criticize Truman for his belief in 
American superiority and his perceived ignorance toward compromise in certain 
situations, specifically his treatment of Communist China.  While Truman could have more 
seriously considered recognition of a communist China, such a decision would have 
alienated many Congressman and officials in the US, jeopardizing the rehabilitation of 
Europe and Japan in the process. McCarthyism was in full swing as 1950 dawned, creating 
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hesitation for any alliance with Communist groups, much less a communist nation. 
Additionally, many historians critical towards Truman forget the strides made by the 
Truman administration throughout the Pacific. His administration helped bring 
independence to Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon, facts sadly overlooked due to the ultimate 
failure of his containment policy of Indochina.  In the end, the Truman administration faced 
a nearly impossible situation in Vietnam. It could not afford to alienate the French by 
remaining “neutral” in Southeast Asia because France played too large of a role in European 
Recovery and communist containment. Thus, American involvement in Vietnam was 
established in order to solidify the cooperation of the French in European recovery.  While 
the US sought to satisfy its other foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia, Japan and 
Europe, a non-communist, friendly Vietnam played an essential role. The origins of 
American involvement in Vietnam must be understood in that context.  
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